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COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF
EXISTENCE AND AMOUNT OF DEFENDANT'S
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLCY*
I. INTRODUCTION AND GEwERAL BACKGROUND
Following an automobile accident the average claimant, after
assessing the amount of his loss, usually asks the other party (ies)
involved, "Do you have insurance?" Next follows, "How much?"
To him these questions are not unusual, nor does he see any-
thing wrong in asking them. There is, however, a clear diver-
gence of opinion among commentators1 and federal 2 and state
* Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967) ; Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967).
1. See 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
RuIEs EDITION 647.1 (1961) ; Fournier, Pre-Trial Discovery of Insurance Cov-
erage and Limits, 28 FoRDHAm L. Ray. 215 (1959); Frank, Discovery and In-
surance Coverage, 1959 INs. L.J. 281; Lavorci, Discovery of Insurance Policy
Limits, 6 DE PAUL L. REv. 225 (1956-1957) ; Thode, Some Reflections on the
1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining to Wit-
nesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discovery, 37 Tax. L. REv. 33, 40-42 (1958) ;
Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort
Cases, 10 ALA. L. Ray. 355 (1958); 39 N.D.L. REv. 107 (1963); 9 OxLA. L.
REv. 412 (1956).
2. In the following federal district courts discovery of such information has
been allowed: District of Columbia, Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C.
1966); Hawaii, Furunizo v. United States, 33 F.R.D. 18 (D. Hawaii 1963);
Kansas, Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Western District of
Kentucky, Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Montana,
Schwenter v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont 1961); Johanek v.
Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Southern District of New York, Orgel
v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Southeastern District of North
Dakota, Hodges v. Heap, 40 F.R.D. 314 (S.E.D.N.D. 1966) ; Oregon, Hurley v.
Schmid, 37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965); Middle District of Pennsylvania,
Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967). Those federal district
courts in which discovery has been denied are: Eastern District of Illinois,
Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; Southern District of Illinois,
Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Eastern District of New
York, Di Biase v. Rederi A/B Walship, 32 F.R.D. 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1963);
Northern District of Ohio, McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio
1962); Eastern District of Pennsylvania, McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612
(E.D. Pa. 1952), reviewed, 32 Nm. L. Rav. 106 (1952); Western District of
Pennsylvania, Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962). In three
districts different judges have reached divergent results. Discovery was denied
in Connecticut in Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962) and Flynn v.
Williams, 30 F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958) but allowed in Novak v. Good Will
Grange No. 127, Patrons of Husbandry, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 394 (D. Conn. 1961).
In New Jersey discovery was denied in Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476
(D.N.J. 1962) but permitted in Hill v. Greer, 30 F.I.D. 64 (D.NJ. 1961).
Discovery was allowed in the Eastern District of Tennessee in Brackett v.
Woodall Food Prods., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) but not permitted in
Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), Hillman v. Penny, 29
F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), and McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D.
Tenn. 1955).
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courts with respect to the discoverability of liability insurance
and its limits; i.e., whether a claimant in an automobile collision
case can require the defendant to disclose his liability insurance
and its policy limits.
Generally, when a relationship between the provisions of the
insurance policy and the issues in dispute can clearly be shown,
the terms of the defendant's liability insurance are discoverable.
Discovery is allowed to disclose the relationship of the parties
(e.g., master-servant), the ownership of property, or previous
accidents.4 The relevancy of policy provisions is apparent in
these cases. The problem arises when this relevancy cannot be
so clearly established.
Rules 33 and 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
prescribe the relevancy standard in the federal courts. State
relevancy standards appear under statutes or rules of court
in jurisdictions with Federal Rules analogues.5 Rule 33 states,
that "[i] nterrogatories may relate to any matter which can be in-
quired into under Rule 26(b)."11 Rule 26(b) provides:
3. In the following states discovery has been allowed: Alaska, Miller v.
Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1964), noted it; 40 WAssH. L. REv. 347 (1965);
California, Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951)
and Laddon v. Superior Ct., 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959), re-
viewed 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 693 (1959); Colorado, Lucas v. District Ct., 140
Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959), reviewed, 31 RocKY MT. L. Rav. 387 (1959);
Illinois, People cx rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) ;
Kentucky, Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954); Utah, Ellis v.
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967). States which have denied discovery
are: Arizona, Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Ct., 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746
(1959); Connecticut, Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A.2d 703
(1965) (Connecticut has discovery rules narrower than federal rules); Dela-
ware, Ruark v. Smith, 51 Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959), noted 10 MmcER L.
REV. 333 (1959); Florida, Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957), re-
viewed, 44 VA. L. REv. 623 (1958) and 34 N.D.L. REv. 165 (1958); Idaho,
Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 404 P.2d 589 (1965), reviewed, 17 S.C.L.
REv. 750 (1965) ; Minnesota, Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d
649 (1955), reviewed, 40 MIxx. L. RZv. 183 (1956); Missouri, State ex rel.
Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1963) ; Montana, State ex rel. Hersman v.
District Ct., 142 Mont. 139, 381 P.2d 799 (1963) ; Nebraska, Mecke v. Bahr,
177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964; Nevada, State ex rel. Allen v. Second ju-
dicial Dist. Ct., 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952) (Nevada's discovery rules
arc less liberal than the federal rules) ; Oklahoma, Carmen v. Fishel, 418 P.2d
963 (Okla. 1966) and Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957) ; South Da-
kota, Bean v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957) (South Dakota has dis-
covery rules less liberal than the federal rules).
4. 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PIACMiCE § 26.16[3], at 1189 (2d ed. 1966).
5. Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Ruark v. Smith, 51
Del. 420, 147 A.2d 514 (1959) ; 4 3. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE § 26.16[3], at
1189 (2d ed. 1966).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
Vol. 20
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Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule
30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be
inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.7
Those courts denying discovery of liability insurance have
generally given a strict construction to the rule, while those
allowing it broaden its scope.
Two recent cases, Blomberg v. Pennabaeer,8 decided in a
federal court, and Ellis v. Gilbert,9 a state case, ruled on the
general problem of discoverability of liability insurance. Both
held that the defendant must reply in discovery procedure with
respect to whether he is insured, the name of the insurer and the
limits of the policy. To understand the legal development which
led to these results it is necessary to examine the general reasons
for allowing or disallowing discovery of liability insurance.
II. DiscovERY ALLowED
Courts and commentators have developed many judicial rules
and policy considerations as reasons for allowing discovery of
liability insurance by the claimant. Because many of these rules
are unrelated they will be considered separately.
(a) Whether or not the matters of the existence, terms, and
limits of the automobile liability insurance policy are relevant
to the subject matter is the thread which runs through these
decisions. The terms of a relevant policy, however, are never
disclosed to the jury. Knowledge of the policy's existence would
tend to destroy the requirement of fault as the foundation for
negligence and likely would lead to extravagant verdicts.'0 This,
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
8. 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
9. 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967).
10. Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Mangino v. Bons-
lette, 109 Cal. App. 202, 292 P. 100 (1930).
1968)
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however, does not preclude its discovery by the claimant, since
the test is not whether the information sought would be ad-
missible in evidence but whether it is relevant to the subject
matter of the action.11
In giving its view of "subject matter" and "relevance" the
court in Ellis v. GRilbert stated:
In considering what is the "subject matter" of a lawsuit
we keep in mind that the ultimate objective of any lawsuit
is a determination of the dispute between the parties; and
that the earlier and easier this can be accomplished, with
justice to both sides, the better for all concerned. What-
ever helps to attain that objective is "relevant" to the law-
suit.
12
(b) Disclosure of insurance will facilitate a realistic appraisal
of the case and aid in its preparation. Since the claimant sues
to recover money, he is not interested in a paper judgment.
Whether the defendant has liability insurance frequently con-
trols trial preparation by the claimant. As one court stated:
"That there will be actual rather than nominal recovery con-
ditions every aspect of these cases-investigators, doctors, pho-
tographers, and even the taking of depositions."'18
(c) Disclosure will promote settlement, thereby relieving
congested court calendars. Where injuries are extensive but
insurance coverage low, the plaintiff might be discouraged from
holding out for an amount commensurate with his injuries, but,
instead, accept a smaller settlement.14 With today's conjested
dockets, largely a result of the increasing number of negligence
cases arising out of automobile accidents, the interest of the
administration of justice and the interest of the individual
litigant are served by these settlements.15
11. E.g., Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
12. 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967).
13. People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 238, 145 N.E.2d 588, 593
(1957); accord, Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 519, 345 P.2d 104, 1068
1959).
14. Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Schwentner v. White,
199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct, 37 Cal. 2d
749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951)..
15. Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); People er rel. Terry,
[Vol. 20
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(d) An insurance policy should be relevant while the action is
pending .as well as after it is completed. The court in Maddow
v. 6'rauman.6 supported this proposition and stated:
If the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter
after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while
the action pends? We believe it is. An insurance contract
is no longer a secret, private, confidential arrangement be-
tween the insurance carrier and the individual but it is an
agreement that embraces those whose person or property
may be injured by the negligent act of the insured. We
conclude the answers to the propounded questions are rele-
vant to the subject matter of the litigation. .... 17
(e) The claimant often asserts that the insurance company is
the actual defendant. It is the insurance company which takes
over the defense of the action, furnishes counsel for the defend-
ant, and conducts such investigation, negotiations and settle-
ment as it believes necessary. 18 Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes
recognized the reality of the situation when he stated, "judges
need not be more naive than other men."' 9 Since the insurance
company is in effect substituted as a party, it would seem to
be relevant that the plaintiff know of the existence of insurance
in order to prepare his case and be aware of his real adver-
sary.20 Nor is there any reason why the defendant himself should
object to allowing discovery. He bought the policy to protect
himself and discovery would increase the possibility of settle-
ment within the policy limits.21
(f) Through state financial responsibility laws, through other
state legislation, and through provisions of the insurance policy
itself, courts have found that the benefit of the policy inures to
the injured, making it relevant to the subject matter of the
16. 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
17. Id. at 942, quoted in Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Kan. 1965);
Furumizo v. United States, 33 F.R.D. 18, 19 (D. Hawaii 1963) ; Hurt v. Coo-
per, 175 F. Supp. 712, 713 (W.D. Ky. 1959); and Lucas v. District Ct, 140
Colo. 510, 521, 345 P.2d 1064, 1070 (1959).
18. Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Schwentner v. White,
199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D.
Mont. 1961).
19. People er rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 239, 145 N.E.2d 588, 593
(1957).
20. Lucas v. District Ct, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P2d 1064 (1959) ; People ex rel.
Terry v. Fisher, 12 III. 2d 231, 145 N.E2d 588 (1957).
21. Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1967) ; Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967).
1968]
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case and therefore discoverable. Typical of the safety responsi-
bility laws now being widely enacted throughout the United
States are those relating to suspension of the driver's license
and vehicle registration. If an owner or operator of a vehicle
is involved in an accident resulting in personal injury or in
property damage exceeding one hundred dollars, suspension of
license and registration results unless: (1) within sixty days
security can be posted to satisfy claims or (2) the defendant has
a liability policy of a minimum statutory amount.22 Because
the liability policy is taken out pursuant to compulsory features
of financial responsibility laws, the policy inures to the benefit
of every person negligently injured by the insured as com-
pletely as if the injured party had been named in the policy. As
a result of this public policy of providing compensation for
the injured person, a discoverable interest in the policy is
created.23 Several states have statutes making an injured party
a third party beneficiary of the policy and allowing discovery on
this basis. 24 One district court has held, moreover, that pro-
visions in the policy which permit the plaintiff to proceed
against the insurer after obtaining a judgment against the de-
fendant are themselves sufficient to allow discovery of the
policy's provisions as relevant to the subject matter of the
personal injury action.
2 5
Finally, the increase in automobile use and the resulting in-
crease in accidents have occasioned the modern legislative trend,
both federal and state, toward increasing the stringency of auto-
motive regulations and protective measures. It is from the tenor
and purpose of this legislation that the courts find insurance
policies relevant to the subject matter of pending actions aris-
ing from accidents covered by these policies. 26
22. 71 HARV. L. Rv. 1167 (1958); see, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-701 to
-750.28 (1962).
23. See, e.g., Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Johanek v.
Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont 1961); Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct, 37
Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) ; Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d
1064 (1959); People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588
(1957). But see Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
24. E.g., Lucas v. District Ct, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959); People
ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957). But see Cooper
v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
25. Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961) ; cf. Johanek v.
Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961).
26. Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951);
accord, Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
[Vol. 20
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. (g) Many of the cases denying discovery assert that if discov-
ery of insurance coverage were allowed, there would be no reason
why the defendant could not be required to disclose other in-
formation with regard to his property. Courts allowing dis-
covery stress that liability insurance is not in the same category
as other assets, since it was purchased for the sole purpose of
protection in the event of litigation.27
(h) Most courts agree that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, or similar state provisions, should be liberally construed.
Full disclosure, stress the advocates of discovery, would promote
the function of the rules; "to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action." 28 To allow discovery is
the better rule, because it is more in agreement with the object
and purpose of the rules of civil procedure. Discovery will
tend to eliminate secrets, mysteries and surprise. It will promote
the disposition of cases without trial and aid in obtaining just
results in the cases which are tried.2 9 Not to allow discovery
would contravene the purpose of the Federal Rules by requiring
two steps in a discovery proceeding where one would suffice. 0
The trial is not a sporting event but a search for truth.,1 As one
court stated: "The whole purpose of litigation is to obtain re-
sults fair to both sides, not to play a game of hide and seek."3 2
The court in As. ,v. Farwell 33 stated:
It is a strange situation indeed, when under our established
rules of civil procedure we emphasize that their avowed
purpose is to establish the "truth" and require "full dis-
closure," while at the same time we treat a policy of liability
insurance as though it is so sacrosanct that not even a court
27. 4 J. MooRe, FEamiAL PRACTICE § 26.16[3], at 1189 (2d ed. 1966) ; see, e.g.,
Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); People ex rel. Terry v.
Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) ; Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d
939 (Ky. 1954).
28. FED. R. CIrv. P. 1; see, e.g., Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D.
Pa. 1967).
29. Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Lucas v. District Ct,
140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
30. Laddon v. Superior Ct, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959). Dis-
covery rules eliminate the necessity of ancillary proceedings, which once were
the only means of establishing a discoverable interest of the plaintiff in the
defendant's policy.
31. Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958).
32. Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8, 11 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
33. 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965).
1968]
7
et al.: Comments
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouT CAROINA LAw REvmw
of justice may glance at it. Confidence in the courts and
in court procedure is not enhanced by this judiciai atti-
tude.34
I. DiscovRY DiSALWOWm
The reasons that courts have developed for not allowing dis-
covery of liability insurance are numerous and distinct. As in
the previous section they will be discussed separately in sub-
paragraphs.
(a) Like the cases allowing discovery, those denying it turn
on the basic issue of relevance. The cases hold that the existence
or non-existence of liability insurance has no bearing on the
issue of the case; that liability insurance is not evidentiary
matter which may be used at trial; that liability insurance is not
relevant to the subject matter of the trial; and that liability
insurance cannot reasonably lead to discovery of evidence on
the issue.A5 Brooks v. Owens"8 states that the basic concept of
the judicial system is:
to insure to citizens of this state and nation an entry
into the courts for the purpose of (1) proving liability for
an injury and (2) proving damages occasioned thereby.
Limits of insurance carried by a defendant in a cause of
action are not relevant to either of those basic purposes.
3 7
(b) The argument that the liability of the defendant should
be determined without regard to his financial ability is rein-
forced by the obvious premise that the extent of the plaintiff's
injuries will be the same whether or not the defendant carries
insurance. The case should be decided on its merits rather than.
on the fact that the defendant does or does not carry liability
insurance. The defendant's liability should first be established;
then the aid of the court can be solicited in the collection of
judgment.38
(c) If insurance can be discovered, it may be argued that all
of the defendant's assets available to satisfy a judgment against
34. Id. at 555.
35. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Langlois v. Allen,
30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962); Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.1.D. 197 (S.D. II.
1958); Flynn v. Williams, 30 F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn 1958); Goheen v. Goheen,
9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 A. 393 (1931).
36. 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
37. Id. at 699.
38. Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); see, e.g., Carmen v.-
Fishel, 418 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1966). , .-
[Vol., 20
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him are likewise subject to discovery. Cases denying discovery
conclude that liability insurance is but one resource among
many which could be used to satisfy a judgment.3 9 If discovery
were allowed, it would be possible for anyone to ascertain the
assets of another by merely filing a complaint against him and
submitting interrogatories. A claim could be fabricated for the
sole purpose of discovering the assets of the party charged.40
In addition to leaving the door open for the individual who
might have a phony claim to require anyone to divulge his
assets, discovery would enable any scoundrel to force a decent
person into a settlement of a possibly invented case. The courts
stress that a man's contract should be his own, whomever it be
with, and that the rules of civil procedure should not be suscep-
tible to this abuse. 1
(d) Opponents of discovery argue that discovery actually re-
tards the possibility of settlement. These courts and commentators
admit that low policy limits may expedite settlement. They con-
tend, however, that with disclosure of high limits, the value
of the plaintiff's case will increase in his eyes in proportion to
the amount of coverage, and that he will be encouraged to in-
crease his claim and risk trial before a sympathetic jury.42 Some
courts, moreover, question whether these settlements are within
the policy of the Federal Rules at all. Since few tort actions
regard the ability to pay as relevant, it should not be assumed
that the Federal Rules are intended to alter substantive tort
law. 43 Many courts believe that the word "determination" in
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state
rules refers to the disposition of the action in a manner which
the court controls; and that therefore determination by the
parties outside the court is not within the scope or purpose of
the rules. Courts, therefore, should have no control over settle-
ments.44
39. Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.PTD. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Gallimore v. Dye,
21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958). Contra, Johanek v Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D.
Mont. 1961).
40. Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R-D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
41. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967).
42. Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.NJ. 1962); Developments in
the-Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. :Fv. 940, 1018-20 (1961).
43. 5 STAx. L. REv. 322 (1953) ; see Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962); Lucas v. District Ct., 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
44. Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); accord,
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
1968j
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(e) Upon discovery of the defendant's liability insurance pro-
visions the plaintiff is placed at a strategic advantage. Although
the law favors compromise settlements, it is not the purpose of
discovery rules to give one party an advantage over the other.
45
A dissenting justice in Lucas v. District Court" stated:
The stance of protective benevolence assumed by the major-
ity opinion clothes a plaintiff in warm winter garb but
leaves a defendant nude or at least ill clothed before the
frigid stares of his opponents and the public. He can have
no modesty. His financial virtues are exposed to public
gaze and possible rapacious seizure without proper regard to
whether the act is legitimate; i.e., without due regard to his
actual negligence.
47
(f) Many courts denying the disclosure of insurance coverage
state that to require such disclosure would violate the defendant's
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and would contravene the fifth amendment. Moreover,
the fundamental right of the defendant to have his day in
court would be curtailed. The possible benefits of discovery do
not outweigh the denial of these rights.
48
(g) Like all matters of procedure, discovery has its limits.
Those opposed to discovery, while conceding that the possible
value of settlement and reduced court congestion might warrant
a liberal construction, contend that the permissible limit is
exceeded with disclosure of liability insurance provisions.
49 It
is not essential to a liberal construction of procedural rules that
there be a change in the practice formerly employed. The word
"liberal" does not mean change.
(h) Any advantages the plaintiff may gain through discovery
are, in these courts' minds, neither advantages pertinent to the
presentation of his case at trial nor advantages which will permit
disclosure of information which is the object of discovery
45. Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; Jeppeson v. Swan-
son, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363
S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963); see, e.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill.
1958) ; Ruark v. Smith, 51 Del. 420, 447 A.2d 514 (1959).
46. 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
47. Id. at 530, 345 P.2d at 1073.
48. Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958). For a thorough discus-
sion of the constitutional arguments see 34 Noa DAmE L. REv. 78 (1958).
49. Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962) ; Jeppeson v. Swan-
son, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
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procedure."0 The courts admit that the ultimate goal of dis-
covery is to obtain information which may be utilized for the
defense or proof of an action. They concede that its purpose
is to remove the element of surprise from trials by allowing
all information germane to the action to be discovered prior
to trial. These courts emphasize, however, that information
sought which can have no bearing on the determination of the
action on its merits is not within procedural rules. The rules
are not intended to supply such information for the personal use
of a litigant. 1 "Subject matter" in the rules concerns the issue
of liability; and the discovery of the existence of liability in-
surance, its provisions and limits, is not relevant to the issue of
liability and therefore not within the purpose of rules of civil
procedure.
IV. CoNCLsoI
A definite division within the nation's judicial system exists
today with respect to whether discovery of liability insurance, its
limits and provisions, should be permitted.52 Joseph P. Jenkins,
of the Kansas bar, expressed one approach to the problem:
An analysis of the arguments and contentions, fears and
complaints, pure legal reasoning, and some not so pure, and
the apparent prejudice and bias for and against insurance
companies, and the plaintiffs and defendants in general,
which parade across the confused reader's gaze leads
one literally to throw up his hands and agree with John
Arbuthnot that "Law is a bottomless pit." And indeed
it is when the courts reach a problem which on its face
should be devoid of innate complexities, but which upon
close analysis presents a subject which unfortunately has
become incapable of a ready, tolerable, clear, and complete
solution. We are disposed to accept reason and clear purpose
as the goal of law and cherish the idea that law is the
embodiment of intellectual thought, analysis, and reason,
tempered with a meaningful portion of justice and plain un-
fettered common sense. For as Sir Edward Coke said,
50. McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
51. Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); accord,
Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 404 P.2d 589 (1965) ; State ex rel. Bush v.
Elliott, 363 S.W2d 631 (Mo. 1963); Carmen v. Fishel, 418 P.2d 963 (Okla.
1966).
52. See, e.g., Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Ct., 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746
(1959).
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"Reason is the life of the law." But, looking over the in-
ability of the courts to solve uniformly the basically simple
uncluttered concept of disclosure, one wonders whether
Mr. Bumable's [sio] exasperated observation that law is an
ass may not have more merit when considered within the
present context.58
Are there any possible solutions? Judges have observed that,
because of the expanding number of judicial positions expressed
in this controversy, many courts first determine a result and
then choose a position on insurance discovery which fits this
result.A One court has chosen a middle of the road position. It
would allow discovery of insurance in a limited context when
liability is admitted and damages are substantial. It would
deny discovery when liability is highly disputed.5 5 There is a
widely supported view to the effect that discovery rules should
be extended or liberalized only through legislative amendments."8
This could possibly take the form of a statutory requirement of
the public filing of such documents as insurance policies.5 7 New
Jersey has followed this approach and has explicitly required
in its rules the disclosure of liability or property damage in-
surance. 8
Recently the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States presented its
preliminary draft of proposed amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts Relating to
Deposition and Discovery."0 Contained in this draft is an amend-
ment to Rule 26 (b) to allow discovery by a party of the exist-
ence and contents of any insurance agreement.60 These draft
53. Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quillets
of the Law, 14 KAx. L. Rrv. 59, 78 (1965).
54. Di Biase v. Rederi A/B Walship, 32 F.R.D. 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Mc-
Daniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
55. Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
56. Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Brooks v. Owens,
97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 404 P.2d 589
(1965); Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Meche
v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 384, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964); State ez rel. Allen v. Second
Judicial Dist. Ct., 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); accord, Hooker v. Ray-
theon Co., 31 F.RD. 120 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (action for wrongful death at sea);
Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957) (malpractice suit).
57. Developments in the Law--Discovery, 74 HAuv. L. REv. 940, 1018-20
(1961).
58. N.J.R. 4:16-2; see Degnan, Enlarging Kansas- Discovery, 11 KAN. L.
REv. 221, 233 (1959).
59. 88 S. Ct. 1 (1968).
60. Id. at 15.
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amendments have not yet been submitted to or considered by the
Judicial. Conference or the Supreme Court, and it should be
understood that the Court is in no way commi ed to them.
The problem has not yet arisen in South Carolina. Because
either side of the discovery issue can be reasonably argued, it
is difficult to determine the future resolution of the issue in
this state, It is suggested, however, that perhaps the sounder
view is to allow discovery. If the purposes, objectives, and
philosophy of the modern discovery rules are to eliminate secrecy
and surprise and to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action, should not discovery be allowed
when liability insurance exists to protect those seeking such
disclosure? Through a liberal interpretation of such words as
"relevancy," "issues," and "subject matter," a common sense
approach can allow disclosure without straining the judicial
conscience. 61 Discovery of the existence, provisions and limits
of liability insurance would foster and encourage the execution
of judicial proceedings with "candor and honesty and without
cunning and deception.162
PmnLiF E. WAxmn
61. Jenlins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance Limits: Quillets
of the Law, 14 KAN. L. REv. 59 (1965).
62. Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P2d 39, 42 (1967).
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LABOR LAW-A UNION'S RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE ITS
MEMBERS THROUGH COURT ENFORCED FINES*
The United Auto Workers Union, bargaining agent for em-
ployees at two Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company plants
in Wisconsin, called strikes at both plants in support of new
contract demands. During the course of the strikes, members of
the Union crossed the picket lines and returned to work. This
conduct violated the Union's constitution and by-laws.' After
the strikes ended, formal charges of conduct unbecoming a union
member were brought against the offenders. At a hearing before
a union trial committee, fines ranging from $20.00 to $100.00
were levied against the strike violators. The Union brought an
action against one of the members in a Wisconsin state court
to collect the fine and obtained a judgment in its favor. Allis-
Chalmers immediately filed charges with the National Labor
Relations Board, claiming that the fines were unfair labor
practices under Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor
Relations Act. This section forbids unions to "restrain or coerce"
employees in the exericse of their rights granted by Section 7
to "refrain from concerted union activity."2 The Board dismissed
the complaint,3 and a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. On rehearing en bane the Seventh Circuit reversed the
Board's decision finding the Union guilty of an 8(b) (1) (A)
violation.4 The United States Supreme Court, in a 54 decision,
reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that court enforced fines
fell within the protection of the proviso to Section 8(b) (1)
* NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
1. The Constitution and by-laws of the Union provided that such action con-
stituted conduct unbecoming a union member and that each violation was pun-
ishable by fines up to $100.00. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.),
149 N.L.R.B. 67, 75 (1964).
2. Sec National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(b) (1) (A) (1964). The relevant portions of the Act are:
§ 157[7] Employees shall have the right ... to engage in .. .concerted
activities ...and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities ....
§ 158(b) (1) (A) [8(b) (1) (A)] It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157[7] of this title: Provided, That this para-
graph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein ....
3. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
4. Allis-Chalmers v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
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(A) since they were directed at the regulation of internal union
affairs.6 To understand this decision it would be helpful to
review briefly the legislative background of 8(b) (1) (A) and
its intended purpose.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was an attempt
by Congress to curb employer abuse by guaranteeing to em-
ployees the right to engage in concerted activity in self-
organization and collective bargaining.6 Later the need for
similar control of union activities was recognized and the result
was the Taft-Hartley amendments. Section 8 (b) (1) (A) was in-
corporated as an amendment primarily to give employees the
equal right to refrain from the concerted activities guaranteed by
Section 7 of the NLRA.7 This amendment was basically aimed at
prohibiting physical violence and job discrimination by unions
against their members." Senator Robert Taft, a leading proponent
of the amendment, attributed a broader purpose to its applica-
tion. He asserted that the section should be analogous to Section
8(a) (1) 9 which prohibits interference by an employer with an
employee's Section 7 rights.10 This general interpretation of
8(b) (1) (A) has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB.'1 The Court
in its discussion of the section stated:
It was the intent of Congress to impose upon Unions the
the same restrictions which the Wagner Act imposed on
employers with respect to violations of employee rights.1 2
Neither this case nor legislative history, however, answers
specifically whether Section 8(b) (1) (A) proscribes union dis-
ciplinary fines.13 In order to evaluate the AZiis-Chalmers de-
cision, therefore, it will be useful to examine the treatment of
other 8(b) (1) (A) questions.
5. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
6. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
7. 93 CONG. REc. 4016 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball).
8. NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1960).
9. 93 CONG. REc. 4021 (1947).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964). For example, if Allis-Chalmers in the
above case had taken away the insurance benefits of those employees on strike,
this would have clearly been a violation of 8(a) (1).
11. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
12. Id. at 738.
13. See Comment, 8(b)(1)(A) Limitations Upon Right of a Union to Fine
its Members, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 47 (1966) (An analysis reaching the conclu-
sion that history indicates that 8(b) (1) (A) should proscribe union disciplin-
ary fines). But see 94 ILL. BJ. 832 (1966).
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The prohibitions 'embodied in Section 8(b) (1) (A) have
caused the judiciary and the National Labor Relations'Board
considerable difficulty when brought into -conflict with the
section's proviso. This proviso reserves to the union the right
"to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership."' 4 Judicial interpretation of the conflict
between union violation of 8 (b) (1) (A) and union power under
the proviso has been far from uniform. Certain union conduct,
however, has consistently been brought within its prohibitions
without piercing the proviso's protection. An 8 (b) (1) (A) viola-
tion is clearly established if a union resorts to violence, threats
or physical harm to force compliance with its rules.15 A union
is also prohibited from enforcing rules which have a direct effect
upon the employment status of a member. A union, therefore,
may not cause an employer to interfere with a member's job
rights8 nor promote threats of discharge or actual loss of
employment.
17
With equal consistency, however, courts have refused to find
8(b) (1) (A) violations when the union seeks to discipline its
members for rule infractions through threats of suspension or
actual expulsion from the union.'" This union conduct is squarely
within the proviso's "acquisition or retention of membership,' 9
protective language.
The cases involving union disciplinary fines have caused the
greatest judicial conflict between 8(b) (1) (A) and its proviso.
Courts have used a variety of policy arguments in attempting
to balance the rights granted to individual union members by
Section 7 with the right of the unions to maintain discipline
within their ranks.
In Perry Norvel Oompay 2° the NLRB briefly stated its
position on the question of union fines. "[11n that Section, 158
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1964).
15. E.g., United Steel Workers of America, 153 N.L.P.B. 1561 (1965);
Painters Dist. Council Local 725, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951), enforced, 202 F.2d
957 (6th Cir. 1952) (mem.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 995 (1953).
16. E.g., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 96 (1954), en-
forced, 228 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952 (1956).
17. E.g., A. 0. Smith Corp. v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 103, 115 (7th Cir. 1965);
Majestic Molded Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 71 (1963), enforced, 330 F.2d 603
(2d Cir. 1964); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
18. Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967); American Newspaper
Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), affd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1952). . .
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
20. 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
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(b) (1) (A) [8(b) (1) (A)] Congress was aiming at means, not
at ends." 21 The Board, in other words, has looked at the method
of enforcing discipline for violations of a union rule, rather than
the rule itself.22 Moreover, while freely admitting that fines are
coercive,23 the Board has concerned itself primarily with whether
this form of disciplinary action affected the employees' employ-
ment status.24 This rather narrow approach has caused con-
fusion in some recent decisions concerning the balancing of
individual rights with union security.
In Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.)25 the union had
imposed a ceiling on piecework production and members who
exceeded the ceiling were subject to fines up to $100.00. The
Board held that such fines concerned the employee only in his
relationship with the union, and not his employment status. The
fines were a regulation of internal union affairs and within
the protection of the proviso. However, in Local 138, Interna-
tiona Union of Operating Engineers (Charles S. Skura) 26 a case
decided a few months later, the Board found the union guilty
of an 8(b) (1) (A) violation when it fined an employee for
filing unfair labor practice charges against the union. The
Board based its decision on the policy argument that it was
in the public interest for an employee to have free access to
Board procedure. The Board stated further:
There can be no doubt . . . that the imposition of a fine
by a labor organization upon a member who files charges
with the Board does restrain and coerce that member in
the exercise of his right to file charges. The union's con-
duct is no less coercive where the filing of the charge is
alleged to be in conflict with an internal union rule or
policy and the fine is imposed allegedly to enforce that
internaZ policy.27
21. Id. at 239.
22, See, e.g., Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67,
70 (1964).
23. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 479, 151 N.L.R.B. 555 (1965);
Peerless Tool & Eng'r Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 853 (1955).
24. Id.
25. 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
26. 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
27. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
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This was an apparent departure from the test used in Wiacon-
sin Motors, and the Skura decision has been followed in later
cases in which the same question was presented.
28
In considering the question presented in Allis-Chalmers, how-
ever, the Board utilized the approach it had previously taken in
Wisconsin Motors. Failing to find an 8(b) (1) (A) violation, it
stated:
[rIhe Respondents have properly maintained the distinction
between treatment of the individual as a member of the
Union and treatment of him as an employee. They have
imposed the fine only on their own members.
29
The Board, therefore, seems to value the right of a union to
maintain internal discipline through the imposition of fines
more than the right of an individual to cross a picket line
and return to work. In contrast the Board favors an individual's
right to seek redress by filing unfair labor practice charges.
Unlike the Board, the Seventh Circuit's balancing of interests
in Allis-Chalmers showed a greater concern for the protection
of individual rights. The majority en banc of the Seventh
Circuit did not find it necessary to resort to legislative history
in order to reach its conclusion that the Union's conduct was
an unfair labor practice. The majority read Section 8(b) (1)
(A) as clearly indicating that union members who crossed a
picket line were exercising their rights under Section 7.30 The
court asserted, moreover, that the imposition of a substantial fine
could easily result in a far greater threat to an individual than
expulsion from the Union or actual loss of employment.
Attention was directed to the fact that there was a union
security clause in existence at both plants involved, which
required an employee, as a condition of employment, to join the
union within thirty days after being hired. The majority
reasoned that, because this requirement destroyed voluntary
choice, an employee should be afforded even greater protection
from coercive union conduct. The court found that the fines had a
direct influence upon a member's employment status and could
not be said to relate only to the Union's internal affairs. Conse-
28. American Bakery & Confectionary Workers Local 300, 167 N.L.R.B.
76 (1967); Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 238, 156 N.L.R.B. 997 (1966).
29. Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 69
(1964).
30. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 20
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quently, the fines imposed violated 8 (b) (1) (A) and were out-
side the protection of the proviso. Although not essential to
its holding, the court recognized that an overall study of the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act revealed a clear
intent on the part of Congress "to balance the national labor
policy by placing limitations on coercive union conduct similar
to those previously prescribed for employers."31
In Allis-ChabmerO32 the Supreme Court was presented with an
opportunity to clear up the uncertainty and conflict in balanc-
ing the underlying policy interests that collided when a union
fined its members. The majority of the Court easily dismissed
the holding of the Seventh Circuit, stating that the wording
of 8(b) (1) (A) was ambiguous on its face and that a literal
reading was unwarranted in the light of the legislative history
of the section. The Court went into a lengthy examination of
the history of 8(b) (1) (A), focusing its main attention on
the Senate debates concerning the scope of 8 (b) (1) (A) and the
meaning of the proviso. The Court found that "the proviso pre-
serves the rights of unions to impose fines as a lesser penalty
than expulsion. . . .,"33 The Court concluded that the general
history of congressional action in this area compelled the finding
that these fines were internal union regulations which Congress
had not attempted to restrict.3 4
It is important now to consider the context in which the Court
allowed the fines to be imposed.
The Court generally followed the policy position that it was
of greater importance for a union to be able to maintain internal
discipline by fining strike breakers, than it was to allow indi-
vidual union members unrestrained freedom to exercise Section
'I rights.3 5 The majority took the position that since a union's
major weapon was the strike, allowing a member to cross a
picket line and go to work would, in effect, flout the will of
the majority of union members who had voted to strike. The
Court asserted that to permit discipline only in the form of
expulsion or suspension (methods clearly within the proviso's
31. Id. at 661.
32. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
33. Id. at 191-92.
34. See A.O. Smith Corp v. NLRB, 343 F2d 103 (7th Cir. 1965); Majestic
Molded Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 71 (1963), enforced, 330 F2d 603 (2d Cir.
1964); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
35. See generally Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HRAv.
L. Rzv. 1049 (1951).
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language "acquisition or retention of membership"3 6 ) was not
enough. The unions also needed the power of the fine. If a weak
union could resort only to expulsion or suspension to enforce its
rules, it would be faced with having to condone disobedience in
order to prevent further depletion of its ranks.
The Court saw no difference between a court-enforceable fine
and one that could be eventually enforced by the union through
expulsion for non-payment. The Court brought both enforce-
ment techniques under the protection of the proviso. The exist-
ence of a union security clause, a fact which had weighed
heavily in the Seventh Circuit's decision, held no significance for
the majority. After finding that the union members involved
enjoyed full union membership, the Court refused to decide
whether fines would be permitted had the membership been
limited solely to the obligation of paying monthly dues.
31
Justice Hugo Black, who wrote the dissenting opinion, asserted
that the majority ignored the plain meaning of Section 8(b)
(1) (A) in order to effectuate "its policy judgment that unions,
especially weak ones, need the power to impose fines on strike-
breakers and to enforce those fines in Court.
' 3 8
The dissent stated that the majority committed a fundamental
error in failing to distinguish between court-enforced fines and
those enforceable by expulsion.3 9 It asserted that the threat of
a large court-enforced fine in some cases would absolutely
restrain the employee from going to work, even if he were willing
to work and risk union expulsion. The coercive nature of this
action would have a direct effect on an employee's job rights-
preventing him from working at all.
The dissent noted that one of the principal thoughts con-
tained in the Senate debates on 8(b) (1) (A) was that its pur-
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
37. See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954). The Court
stated:
[L]egislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent
utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to
compel payment of union dues and fees.
It would seem that judicially enforced payment of a fine is considerably more
than "payment of union dues and fees."
38. 388 U.S. 175, 201 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
39. As one writer has pointed out, this distinction is particularly applicable
when applied to the union shop versus open shop controversy. For if in a union
shop fines may be enforced by court action, then the open shop has a definite
advantage in that only those belonging to a union could be fined. See Note,
Union Disciplinary Power and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act; Limitation on the Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 584 (1966).
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pose was to prohibit union conduct that would be an unfair labor
practice if engaged in by an employer. It contended that to
hold that the words "restrain or coerce" mean something differ-
ent when applied to unions than to employers was incongruous.
Finally the dissent warned that the majority's failure to
decide whether 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits a union from firing an
employee who merely pays dues "makes it highly dangerous for
an employee in a union shop to exercise his Section 7 right to
refrain from participating in a strike called by a union in which
he is a member by name only." 40
It is difficult to determine the extent to which organized
labor will use the court-enforced fine. Certain members of
Congress have already expressed disapproval of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of 8 (b) (1) (A) .41 It is submitted that
the Court's over-balance of interests in favor of added union
power at the expense of individual employee rights, is highly
inconsistent with the "protective guardian" approach it has
taken in regard to individual rights granted by the first ten
amendments. Has the Court, as Justice Black suggests,42 written
a new proviso to 8(b) (1) (A).
Elm soN D. SmrrH, IV
40. 388 U.S. 175, 216 (1967).
41. See 66 L.R.R. 126 (Oct. 16, 1967), which reports an amendment made
by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to a civil rights bill (H.R. 2516), passed
by the House which reads as follows:
Sec. 104. Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec.
158(b) (1) (A) is amended by striking out the semicolon at the end of the
proviso and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the following: 'Provided
further, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to permit any
labor organization or its agents to impose or any court to enforce any fine
or other economic sanction whatever against any member who elects not
to participate in any strike or other concerted activity in accordance with
the rights vested in him by Section (29 U.S.C. 159).'
42. 'What the Court does today is to write a new proviso to Sec. 8(b) (1)
(A) :.'this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization nonarbi-
trarily to restrain or coerce its members in their exercise of Sec. 7 rights."'
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 213 (1967).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INDUSTRIAL REVENUE
BONDS-SOUTH CAROLINA'S ENABLING ACT
DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL*
I. IWMoDuCTIoN
At the instance of the governor,' and faced with the incontest-
able necessity for stimulating industrial growth in South Caro-
line, the South Carolina General Assembly approved the Indus-
trial Revenue Bond Act.2 The express purpose of the Act was to
enable public agencies8 of the State to render assistance to new
or expanding enterprises through the use of tax-exempt revenue
bonds. The development of this type of financing program by
more than thirty states4 evidenced the importance of this legis-
lation. The noted success of the device and this state's transition
from agriculture to industry compelled its passage by the legis-
lature. Having received legislative approval, the validity of the
Act depended upon its conformity with particular federal
standards and the favorable ruling on state constitutional
grounds which came in Elliott v. McAlair. An analysis of the
Act, applying the federal qualifications and a consideration of
the issues presented in Elliott, indicates compliance with all re-
quirements.
II. Tim FnnsuL STAxDADS
The Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income "in-
terest on the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession
* Elliott v. McNair, 156 S.E.2d 421 (S.C. 1967).
1. In his "state of the State" address to the Joint Assembly, Governor Rob-
ert E. McNair emphasized the need for positive legislation concerning industrial
financing saying, in part,
that the use of tax-exempt revenue bonds has reached the stage where
South Carolina may soon become an island in the Southeast. With the
knowledge that major corporations looking at South Carolina are being
swayed in their decision by the availability of this kind of financing else-
where, I recommend the passage of legislation permitting the kind of
revenue bond financing that will allow us to remain competitive. 1 S.C.
H.R. JouR. 144-45 (1967).
2. LV S.C. STATs. AT LAXGE 120 (No. 103, 1967) (hereinafter cited as the
Act).
3. The "public agency" empowered to act in South Carolina is the County
Board. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 120 § 2 (No. 103, 1967).
4. For general historical development through 1966 see 7 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L. Rav. 696 (1966).
5. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 24.
6. 156 S.E.2d 421 (S.C. 1967).
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of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing, or the District of Columbia."7 This exclusion has been
interpreted as applying to the interest on bonds properly issued
by "a duly organized political subdivision acting by constituted
authorities empowered to issue such obligations ... [as obliga-
tions on behaZf of the] State, Territory or possession of the
United States or political subdivision thereof."" Under this
treasury regulation, "[tihe term, 'political subdivision' . . . de-
notes any division of the State ... to which has been delegated
the rights to exercise part of the sovereign power of the state
.... ."9 The Internal Revenue Service considers obligations of a
nonprofit corporation, organized pursuant to the general non-
profit corporation laws of a state, as issued "on behalf of" the
state if each of the following five requirements are met: (1)
the activities of the corporation must be essentially public in
nature; (2) the corporation must not be organized for profit-
except for the retirement of indebtedness; (3) the corporate
income must not inure to private persons; (4) the state or
political subdivision must have a beneficial interest for the
duration of the indebtedness and must gain full legal title upon
retirement of indebtedness to the property for which the indebt-
edness was incurred; and (5) the state or its political subdivision
must approve the corporation and the specific obligations issued
by the corporation. 10
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(a)(1).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (1956) (emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 24. Several revenue rulings favorable
to this type of financing demonstrate the application of these criteria and reflect
the current attitude of the Internal Revenue Service.
Rev. Rul. 54-296, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 59. The beneficial interest for the dura-
tion of the indebtedness may be in the form of ownership of all of the capital
stock of the nonprofit corporation, as when the municipality leased a municipal-
ly-owned building to a nonprofit corporation in exchange for all of its capital
stock. The corporation then proposed to issue bonds to make improvements. The
beneficial interest of the municipality consisted of retention of legal title to the
property, ownership of all the capital stock, and contract rights whereby the
municipality could acquire the improvements by discharging the corporate in-
debtedness.
Rev. Rul. 59-41, 1959-1 Cum. BuuL. 13. A contract right alone is sufficient to
establish a beneficial interest. A municipality entered into a contract with a
nonprofit corporation organized under the general nonprofit corporation laws
of the state and ratified and approved a purchase of a water system by the cor-
poration and the issuance of bonds for this purpose. By the terms of the contract
the municipality could purchase the water system for the amount of indebted-
ness outstanding. In both of the above cases the municipality became absolute
owner of the property upon retirement of the indebtedness.
Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 65; and Rev. Rul. 60-248, 1960-2 Cum!.
BULL. 35 exempt the interest on bonds issued by a public corporation or corporate
1968]
23
et al.: Comments
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CAROLiNA LAW RIW[mw
The South Carolina enabling act was patterned closely after
an Alabama statute" which had already gained federal approval,
and differed only in the provisions peculiar to its application
in this state. The Act empowered the County Board, the regular
governing body of the several counties of the state, ' 2 to acquire,
lease, and issue revenue bonds to defray the cost of acquisition,
improvement and expansion of the industrial sites subject to the
approval of the State Budget and Control Board. The selection
of the county as the political subdivision of the state to issue
bonds is significant not only as providing a natural, organized
subdivision of the state, but also as a very definite factor in
federal acceptance of the Act.13 Commissioner v. Shamberg's
Estate'4 suggested that a mere instrumentality which issued
bonds, collected rentals and distributed payments of principal
and interest would not qualify as an acceptable political subdi-
vision. The County Board, however, qualifies as a corporation
which carries out "a portion of those functions of the state which
by long usage and the inherent necessities of the government
have been regarded as public."'15 Recognition of the county as
an appropriate political unit is evidenced by an excerpt from
a letter to the County Board of Spartanburg County written
by the chief of the Individual Income Tax Branch of the In-
ternal Revenue:
The County is one of the 46 counties of the State of South
Carolina and is a body politic and corporate. The Coury
possesses sovereign powers granted by the Constitution of
governmental agency organized according to state statutes; provided the par-
ticular purpose of their creation is to issue bonds to enable their carrying out
of the declared purpose.
Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cum. Buu.. 28, which sanctions bonds issued by or
on behalf of a municipality for the acquisition and construction of municipally
owned industrial plants for lease to private industry as obligations of a political
subdivision within the meaning of section 22(6) (4) of the 1939 Internal Rev-
enue Code [section 103 of the 1954 Code].
11. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37 § 815-830 (1949).
12. Under the terms of the Act, if any project is located in more than one
county, the governing bodies of the several counties are empowered to work
together.
13. "The selection of the county as the issuer of the bonds was one of the
primary reasons South Carolina's proposal was accepted, while those of Louisi-
ana and other states were not. Originally we had planned to subdivide the state
into Industrial Development Board Units; perhaps, if we had taken this course
our plan would have been rejected also." Interview with Robert E. McNair,
Governor of the State of South Carolina, in Columbia, Dec. 8, 1967.
14. 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
15. Id. at 1004.
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the State of South Carolina and is a political subdivision
of the State of South Carolina.
16
III. "EQUAL Iwcoms SHouLD Bn EQuAL LTABmm Es"
Though qualified and within federal standards, the industrial
revenue bond has strong opposition. The exclusion of the interest
on the bonds from gross income has been characterized as a
"truckhole" in the tax law.' 7 It has been suggested that the use
of tax-exempt revenue bonds to promote private ventures will
result in a competitive advantage for those firms which qualify
to use this m e t ho d of financing; i.e., a disproportionate
tax burden will have to be borne by those income producing
activities which are inherently incapable of using the device.
18
There is some validity in this criticism. Some type of busi-
nesses will not be able to qualify for this funding. There will
rarely be discrimination in funding, however, among competing
businesses or industries. The more serious aspect of unfair
competition is that industries financed by these tax-exempt
bonds will accumulate more working capital on the savings
resulting from lower interest rates paid on the bonds. Techni-
cally there will be a state subsidy to the industry's income
amounting to the difference between the interest charged under
the present tax exemption and the lowest interest rate obtain-
able from private sources.
Another basic tax principle, that "taxpayers in similar cir-
cumstances should have similar burdens," is offended by exclud-
ing the interest paid on revenue bonds in computing gross income.
By purchasing these tax-exempt revenue bonds the taxpayer
may avoid a portion of the tax burden which he would other-
wise have to carry. It is arguable that this "loophole" could
cause the ordinary taxpayer to lose respect for the tax system,
the strength of which is fairness and equity among taxpayers. 19
16. Letter from Lester W. Utter to the County Board of Spartanburg County,
Nov. 22, 1967, copy on file in Governor's office.
17. Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures wuith Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Devel-
oping "Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 224 (1965).
18. Id. at 225.
19. Kirby, State and Local Bond Interest, HousE Comms. ON WAYs AND
MFANS, 1 TAx REVISIoN COMPENDIUm, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 679 (Comm. Print
1959) (hereinafter cited as 1 TAx REvIsIoNT COMPENDIUm); Barkin, Exclusion
from Taxable Income of Interest on Municipal Bonds to Subsidize Industry
Should Be Discontinued, 1 TAx REVISION COmPENDIutm r 729 (1959).
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IV. INTMGOVERNMNTAL IMMUN=
Since 1819 when Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized "[tihat
the power to tax involves the power to destroy,"2 0 the doctrine
of intergovernmental immunity, although restricted,2 1 has been
jealously guarded. There is authority that, as a principle of
constitutional construction, the doctrine should be narrowly
construed. This argument reasons that the expansion of im-
munity of one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign
power of the other to tax. When the immunity is invoked by
an individual (or corporation), therefore, it operates for the
benefit of the individual (or corporation) at the immediate
expense of the taxing government; and without corresponding
benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is
claimed.22 No one will dispute that the individual (or corpora-
tion) benefits. The argument loses some force, however, when
it attempts to demonstrate the corresponding detriment to the
federal government and to the county which has "lent" its
immunity to the corporation. The industrialization of a shrinking
agrarian society will operate to curb unemployment and gener-
ally stimulate the economic growth of the community. Each
new job will produce taxable income and allow the state and
federal government to cancel, at least theoretically, one relief
check. The increased production of the expanding industries
will give rise to an increase in taxable sales (a benefit to the
state) and accordingly affect the taxable gross income of the
industry. These factors should be weighed against the "loss"
in revenue on these bonds.
At an early date Weston v. Ckarlesto 23 recognized that an
attempt by the state to tax the stock of the United States not
only operated upon the contract between the government and
the individual, but also affected the power to borrow money on
the credit of the United States. Similarly, if the federal govern-
ment imposed a tax on the income of revenue bonds, it would
diminish one of the attractive features of the bonds-the tax
exempt interest to large investors in high tax brackets. This
20. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
21. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhart, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (federal income tax
on salaries of employees of state government not unconstitutional) ; Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (State income tax on salary
of federal employees ruled not an unconstitutional burden).
22. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939).
23. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 468 (1829).
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would decrease the impetus for industries to expand and accept
these offers in a ratio inversely proportional to the increased
cost of funding.
24
This type of "non-profit lessor" financing (i.e., one in which
the county makes no profit on the sale of the tax-exempt bonds)
should be distinguished from cases in which the state has more
of a proprietary interest and a profit motive is involved.25 The
authority for state exemption from federal taxation in this
situation, is found in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Com-
pany.28 The case held that the federal government lacked
the power to tax the property or revenues which the state
collected from state securities. Affirming the decision upon re-
hearing, the Court stated:
We have unanimously held in this case that so far as this
law operates on the receipts from municipal bonds it cannot
be sustained, because it is a tax on the power of the states,
and on their instrumentalities to borrow money and conse-
quently repugnant to the constitution.
27
24. See generally Ely, Federal Taxation of Interest Paid by States and
Political Subdivision upon Their Obligations, 1 TAx RMSION COMPENDIUM
784 (1959).
25. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905). A federal
tax on the sale of liquor in state owned stores operated by agents of the state
was upheld. The Court stated:
It is reasonable to hold that, while the former [federal government] may
do nothing by taxation in any form to prevent the full discharge by the
latter [state government] of its governmental functions, yet, whenever a
state engages in a business which is of a private nature, that business is
not withdrawn from the taxing power of the nation.
See also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). The state of New
York, in selling bottled mineral waters taken from springs owned by the state,
was not immune from a nondiscriminatory federal excise tax on soft drinks.
26. 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
27. Id. at 630. This position was strongly supported by the other Justices,
who dissented on other grounds. Id. at 652 (Justice White's dissent) :
In regard to the right to include in an income tax the interest upon the
bonds of municipal corporations, I think the decisions of this court, hold-
ing that the federal government is without the power to tax the agencies of
the state government, embrace such bonds, and that this settled line of
authority is conclusive on my judgment here. It determines the question
that where there is no power to tax for any purpose whatever, no direct
or indirect tax can be imposed.
Id. at 654 (Justice Harlan's dissent)
[M]unicipal corporations, exercising powers and holding property for the
benefit of the public-are not subjects of national taxation in any form
or for any purpose, while the property of private corporations and of
individuals is subject to taxation by the general government for national
purposes. So it has been frequently adjudged and the question is no
longer an open one in this court.
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Since the federal government has never successfully taxed
the interest paid on the bonds of the states or their political
subdivisions, a continuation of this policy will in no way "erode"
the present federal tax base. To propose a change would be to
propose federal encroachment on the borrowing power of the
states. The increased burden on the political subdivision would
be tantamount to a federal surcharge on the local government's
taxes and rates for service. 28 The twin powers of the purse, to
borrow and to tax, are delegated to the federal government in
article I, section 8, of the Constitution. They are reserved to
the states by the tenth amendment.20 To the extent that their
borrowing power is curbed by federal taxation, local govern-
ments become unable to shoulder their own financial burden
and must turn to the federal government for assistance. The
increased dependence on the federal government will be re-
flected in a heavier federal tax burden to defray the cost of
local projects priced out of range of the state's borrowing power.
The national interest is benefitted by the states, shouldering their
own financial burdens.
V. APr0ovAL OF THE ACT iN SouTH CAIoaxA
The courts in South Carolina have narrowly construed the
power of political subdivisions to engage in financial operations
when the object to be subserved was not of an essentially public
nature.81 In Haesloop v. Charlesto82 the court observed:
[S]uch benefits from a proposed expenditure as will accrue
from increased taxable values, from enhancement of values
generally, and from increased impetus to the commercial
life of the community will ordinarily be considered of too
incidental or secondary a character to justify the outlay
of public funds 
83
Recently the "public use" doctrine was discussed in Edens v.
City of Columblia.4 Upon examining the concept of eminent do-
main, the court indicated a continuing trend toward a restricted
definition of "public nature."
28. Ely, Federal Taxation of the Interest Paid by States and Political Sub-
diz4sions upon Their Obligations, 1 TAx REvisIoN COMPENIUM 783 (1959).
29. Id. at 789.
30. Id. at 790-91.
31. E.g., Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454 (1931).
32. 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596 (1923).
33. Id. at 286, 115 S.E. at 601 (emphasis added).
34. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
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Why then, in Elliott v. McNair,35 did the South Carolina
Supreme Court seemingly broaden its heretofore narrow inter-
pretation of "public nature"? First, the court was influenced by
the action of the legislature upon the enabling legislation. Al-
though the tax-exempt bonds are to be sold to finance private
industry, the General Assembly characterized this issuance as
a "public purpose." It has been recognized that the question of
whether an act is for a public purpose is primarily for the
legislature. 36
The legislative determination that the promotion of indus-
trial development is for public purpose and thus a proper
government function is presumed to be correct.... Courts
cannot interfere with what the General Assembly has de-
clared to be a public purpose and thus a function of the
government unless the judicial mind conceives that the
legislative determination is without reasonable relation to
the public interest or welfare and is beyond the scope of
legitimate government.17
The Supreme Court, moreover, has refused to interfere with
a state's determination of what constitutes a public purpose.3
In Elliott the court stated that it should never invalidate an
act of the General Assembly unless it was offensive to specific
provisions of the state constitution. Article 10, section 6 of the
constitution strictly limits the powers of a county to levy taxes
and issue bonds.3 9 In light of past decisions, however, this limi-
tation applies solely to general obligation bonds payable from
the proceeds of ad valorem tax levies. 40 The proposed revenue
bonds, payable solely from rentals received, are not affected.
35. 156 S.E.2d 421 (S.C. 1967).
36. See, e.g., McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938) ; Green
v. City of Rock Hill, 149 S.C. 234, 147 S.E. 346 (1929). See also Fairfax
County Indus. Dev. Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150 S.E.2d 87 (1966).
37. Fairfax County Indus. Dev. Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 357, 150
S.E.2d 87, 93 (1966).
38. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
39. S.C. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6, provides in part:
The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any county
or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for edu-
cational purposes, to build and repair public roads, buildings and bridges,
to maintain and support prisoners, pay jurors, County officers, and for
litigation, quarantine and court expenses, and for ordinary county pur-
poses, to support paupers and pay past indebtedness.
40. Benjamin v. Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E2d 737 (1941);
Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.F. 870 (1934).
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Finally, the bonds will not affect the credit of the state since
they are not constitutional debts within article 10, Section 6.41
The South Carolina enabling act allows the bonds to be
secured by a trust indenture. The contention has been raised that
the county might use publicly owned property upon which to
locate the industry. If the industry defaulted on its payments to
the county, the Act might expose publicly owned property to a
mortgage foreclosure sale. OCarke v. South Oaroina Public
Serie Authority,42 however, has already resolved the conten-
tion, holding that there is no constitutional objection if the mort-
gage is limited to the property purchased rather than to pre-
viously owned public lands. The Act clearly provides, moreover,
that only property purchased from the proceeds of revenue bonds
will be mortgaged, and that no property now owned by the
county or to be acquired by taxation will be affected.43
The appellant in Elliott contended that to allow certain
private corporations to borrow money at lower interest rates
than those whose loans were not secured by tax exempt bonds,
violated the equal protection clause of the constitution. 44 There
is no violation, however, if an act applies equally to all the
constituents of a designated class, and the classification is reason-
ably related to the legislative intent.45 Further arguing under
article 1, section 5 (due process clause) and under article 3,
section 31 (public land clause), the appellant asserted that
the provisions of the Act relating to purchase or release of the
industrial facilities at a nominal sum were unconstitutional. The
court declared, in direct conflict with plain constitutional
language, that public agencies should be allowed to exercise dis-
cretion and weigh indirect benefits to the public in their deci-
sion.46 In all probability, however, this will become academic as
41. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 19 F. Supp. 932 (1932) ;
Benjamin v. Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E.2d 737 (1941); Park v.
Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870 (1934).
42. 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935).
43. LV S.C. STATS. AT LAGE 120, § 5 (No. 103, 1967).
44. S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 5.
45. Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865 (1930).
46. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 31, declares that land shall not be sold to corpora-
tions "for a less price than that for which it can be sold to individuals." Perhaps
this decision would be more palatable if this "judicial legislation" were cured
by constitutional amendment.
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the "nominal sum," purchase or release provision will soon re-
flect approximate market value.
4 7
Although South Carolina's enactment was preceded by similar
legislation in approximately forty states, it is unique in at
least one of its provisions. Because the property acquired by
the bonds technically became property of the state or its political
subdivision, it has never been subjected to ad Valoi'em taxes,
thereby depriving the subdivision of revenue. Section 6 of the
Act accomplishes this object by requiring that each lease contain
a provision whereby the lessor shall, in lieu of these taxes, pay
to the political unit in which the project is located that amount
which would have been levied on the property had the lessor
been owner.48
VI. CoNcLUsIOz
In considering the future of industrial revenue bonds, it
should be recognized that the increasing popularity and use
of this type of financing increases the opposition to it on the
federal level. The federal government will not allow continued
subsidy to private industries at what it terms its own expense.
The continued abuse of the bonds, through encouraging in-
dustrial growth in areas where labor is already in short supply,
or when the "public purpose" is not served,49 may bring about
control by the Treasury Department whose interest lies in pre-
serving the tax base rather than developing the revenue bond
47. From interview with Robert E. McNair, supra note 14:
Q. Exactly what is meant by "a nominal sum" in the Act; that is, will
one dollar qualify as a nominal sum.
A. (Governor McNair) I cannot say precisely what will qualify as a
nominal sum, but, I can assure you that our interpretation will be
acceptable to federal guidelines which are forthcoming from the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Subsequent to the approval of our enabling
act an entire new slate of requirements pertaining to this type of bond
issue was promulgated, but to my knowledge no printed copies are
available presently.
48. This amount is to be computed exactly as if the ad valorem tax were
being levied, taking into account all deductions and tax exemptions.
49. Industrial Aid Bonds, FEDERAL , EsERVE BANK OF RcH oND MONTHLY
RvImNv 11 (Jan. 1967).
Two specific practices have been singled out for much criticism. One is
the purchase by the corporation of the municipal bonds which were sold
for its benefit. It has been argued that if the company could afford to
purchase its own bonds, it could have provided its own financing. Second
is the sale of bonds to purchase an existing facility which is then leased
back to the corporation already using the facility. This amounts to a
refinancing scheme using tax exempt bonds, since no new jobs are
created.
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program50 It has been suggested that some sort of "purpose
test" be applied to insure that the activities of the state or its
political subdivision are primarily implemented and furthered
rather than some private, outside interest.5 The Internal
Revenue Service has adopted a broad interpretation of what is
beneficial public activity under Revenue Ruling 63-20.52 Several
question are raised by the proposal of such a test: (1) Who would
determine the status of each bond issue? (2) Would the determi-
nation be made before or after the issue of the bonds? (3)
Would a delay to await a ruling, or between the ruling and an
appeal, not destroy a part of the utility of this bond? Al-
though these questions pose complex problems, some type of
solution must be sought. Some means of federal control, via
Congress or the Treasury Department, is inevitable if the states
do not effect control on their own; best estimates predict a
change to be effected sometime in 1969 (due in part to 1968
being an election year). 58
In the face of almost certain change, the question presents
itself: How will South Carolina be affected? While the ad-
vantageous aspects of industrial bond financing have been
recognized in this state, a change "across the board" would, in
absence of retroactive effectiveness (probably unconstitutional)
have little effect on this economy. South Carolina will main-
tain a relatively stable economic position regarding any change
which will be applied universally. 4
After being backed into a corner, the State was forced to
adopt the Act to remain competitive with its neighbors. Having
thus placed itself on an equal footing, South Carolina has again
become actively engaged in the "New War Between the States"
for creating and expanding industry.
NOTE
Effective March 15, 1968 the industrial revenue bond was
banned by a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service. The ruling
was rescinded on March 19, 1968 after a bill to legalize the tax-
50. See generally 7 B.C. Ixu. & Com. L. REv. 696, 703-04 (1966).
51. Spiegel, supra note 18, at 240.
52. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 Cum. BuLl. 24.
53. Interview with Fred R. Sheheen and Sloan Gable, State Development
Board, in Columbia, S.C., Dec. 11, 1967.
54. Id.
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free financing was introduced in the United States Senate. This
ruling was indicative of the sentiment of the Treasury Depart-
ment, and should serve as a further warning to the states
to adopt some measure of uniform control in this area.
J. HAMMTON STEWART, I
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE--ARTICLE FOUR-
PROCESS OF POSTING NOT COMPLETE
UNTIL MIDNIGHT DEADLINE*
"An ordinary lay person might reasonably ask... just when
an item was 'paid' and reasonably expect that some sort of an
answer could be given."'
This was the precise question presented to the Wisconsin
Circuit Court in West Side Bank v. Marine Nationad Exchange
Bank. On a Thursday in August, 1966, the Paine Webber Corp-
oration drew a check on Marine for $262,000.00 to one Swidler,
who deposited it on the same day at West Side. The next morn-
ing West Side presented the check to Marine through the Mil-
waukee clearing house. That night the check was charged to
Webber's account during the computer run. On Monday, the
next business day, the posting continued and the item was
photographed, stamped "paid", cancelled and placed in the
drawer's file.
On Monday afternoon a check for $270,000.00 from Swidler
to Webber was returned to Marine because of insufficient funds.
Upon notification of the dishonor that same afternoon, Webber
issued a stop payment to Marine on its check. Marine notified
West Side by telephone, withdrew the item from Webber's file,
credited the account in the Monday night computer run, and
on Tuesday morning returned the check.
West Side contended that Marine had "paid" the item and
could not revoke its settlement. Applying sections 4-213(1)
(c), (d) and 4-109 of the Uniform Commercial Code the court
held that an item was not paid until the statutory time in which
a settlement could be revoked had elapsed.2 The plaintiff's
motion for a summary judgment was denied.
Before discussing the concept of final payment under the
Uniform Commercial Code, it is necessary to explain briefly
the significance of final payment in banking usage and the state
of the law concerning payment prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
* West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'I Exch. Ban%, Case No. 341-852 (Wise.
Cir. Ct., April 20, 1967).
1. Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265,
288.
2. See Um=F0o COM.MaRCUAL CODE § 4-301.
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When a customer deposits a check in his account at a bank,
the item is treated as if it were cash and a credit is entered.
In the same manner, each bank that handles the check until
it is paid will credit its immediate transferor in the collection
chain upon receipt of the item. The line of credits that result
are tentative in nature and become final only when the drawer's
bank pays the item. 3 Naturally, if the drawee bank refuses to
pay, the credits are reversed. When final payment occurs, the
drawer's liability on the item is replaced by that of his bank.4
This practice has long been used by the banks and is recognized
and codified by the Code.5
Aside from its application to collection and settlement, the
concept of payment is also important when the priority of claims
to the balance of the drawer's account is in issue. There is a
point after which one of the "four legals", seeking to affect the
account or the payment of the check, comes too late to prevent
the depositor's interest from being defeated.6 Unfortunately, this
point is also called payment and since it is generally a point
sooner in time than the collection "payment", there is an inherent
confusion.
The Uniform Commercial Code has continued this dichotomy
in sections 4-213 and 4-303. The latter section utilizes the
same tests as 4-213 to determine the "priority status" of com-
peting claims but applies additional tests. In addition there is
"payment" as used to determine the risk of loss on the failure
of the payor bank7 and the rule that a check is considered paid
if not returned by the payor bank within a certain period of
time.8 The complexity of the situation leads to the query "When
is an item paid?." The importance of determining an answer,
both for the customer and banker, is apparent.
The fixed time standard is appealing because of its evident
ease of application. The length of time should be long enough
3. Malcolm, supra note 1, at 269.
4. See A.B.A. BANK COLLECTION CODE § 3. The text of the act is set forth
at 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1373-75 (1942).
5. See, e.g., UNIFORMa COmmERcAL CODE §§ 4-212, 4-301.
6. Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 331, 362 (1965). The four legals are stop order of the
drawer; legal process affecting the account; drawee bank's right of set-off; and
notice of death or incompetence of the drawer.
7. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Col-
lecting Problem, 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 905, 940 (1949).
8. Id. at 947. For a summary of the difficulty of a single time concept of
payment see id. at 955.
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to allow the payor bank to process and verify the item and
decide whether to pay it. Section 137 of the N.I.L. gave a
drawee bank twenty-four hours to revoke a credit.9 If the
drawee failed to revoke within this time, it was considered to
have paid the item and became liable therefor. At common law
the majority rule varied slightly from the position in the
N.I.L.10 When the payee's account was at the same bank as the
payor's and a credit was given in the payee's passbook for
the item, unless there was some agreement to the contrary, final
payment had occurred.1 Since the bank knew its customers'
accounts, it was unnecessary to extend payment time beyond
entry of the credit to the payee's account.
As the volume of checks grew, a longer period of time was
needed in which a payor bank could decide to pay an "on-us"
item. The ABA Collection Code, section 3,12 extended this time
to the end of the business day of receipt.
With the coming of the Second World War, both the number
of checks and the manpower shortage demanded an extended
period of time for posting.'3 Consequently, nearly all jurisdic-
tions adopted some form of legislation permitting deferred
posting. 14 The Federal Reserve regulations made similar allow-
ances."' Generally, the decision to revoke credits had to be made
by midnight of the next business day.16
While the midnight deadline was the latest time at which an
item could be considered paid, an earlier point of payment was
based on some action of the payor bank with respect to the
item.17 There was wide difference of opinion, however, concern-
ing which action would constitute payment.
9. For a notable application of N.I.L. § 137, see Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank,
220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955 (1908).
10. See Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N.Y. 735 (1871).
11. As to what constitutes sufficient agreement see Ryan v. Columbia Nat'l
Bank, 142 S.C. 231, 140 S.E. 593 (1927), in which the terms on a deposit slip
were held not binding on the customer without a showing of his knowledge and
consent thereto; cf. E.S. Macomber & Co. v. Commercial Bank, 166 S.C. 236,
164 S.E. 596 (1932).
12. 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1373 (1942).
13. CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 84 (1959).
14. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (1962).
15. 12 C.F.R. § 210.5 Reg. 5 (1939), as amended, 13 F.R. 7296 (1948); 25
F.R. 10495 (1960) ; 29 F.R. 12361 (1964).
16. See MODEL DEFERRED POSTING STATUTE, cited in E. FARNSWORTH, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 321 (1959).
17. See generally 1 PATON'S DIGEST 1065 (1942) ; Andrews, The City Clear-
in.q House: Payment, Returns, and Reimbursement, 27 INDIANA L. J. 155 n. 28
(1952).
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Most jurisdictions agreed that payment by cash was final.'8
Some courts, however, framed the issue in terms of the intent of
the parties and subjected the facts to a jury for their determina-
tion.19
The issuance of remittance drafts by the payor bank was the
center of an attempt to pinpoint payment. Drawing by the payor
bank of the remittance draft was generally held not to consti-
tute final payment.20 Others held that receiving the draft was
payment.2 1 Because a draft could be retrieved from the mail,
one court found that mailing the item did not constitute final
payment.
22
Focusing on the steps of the payor's posting of the item, a
number of points were considered as marking payment. Stamp-
ing the check "paid" was rejected as constituting payment by
most courts. 23 Most courts, moreover, rejected certain prelimin-
ary steps which had no relationship to a decision to pay. Usually
the posting to the drawer's account was deemed determinative
of the bank's intention to pay.
24
As the pre-Code cases indicate, "payment" is not one point
in time. It is rather a concept used to fix liability for an item;
and it often depends on the identity of the contesting parties.
The Code makes a distinction between final payment when the
issue arises as to the liability of the payor bank and the collection
process,2 5 and when the issue is whether one of the "four legals"
has come to the payor bank in time to defeat the depositor's
interest in the item. 2 6
18. Bellevue Bank v. Security Nat'l Bank, 168 Iowa 707, 150 N.W. 107
(1915); Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387
(1929).
19. From certain facts, as a matter of law, only one conclusion may be
drawn. Because of the volume and mechanization of modem checking, a factual
standard, such as debiting the drawer's account, is far more workable than the
jury's conclusions as to the parties' intent. See Andrews, siupra note 17, at 159.
See also American Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517 (1913).
20. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670
(1903).
21. Dewey v. Margolis & Brooks. 195 N.C. 307, 142 S.E. 22 (1928).
22. Bohlig v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W2d 445 (1951).
23. First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 127 Tenn. 205, 154 S.W. 965
(1913). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 210 Wis. 533, 246
N.W. 593 (1933).
24. Hay & Stevens v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 Ill. App. 286 (1927). But see
A.B.A. BANK COLLECTION CODE, supra note 4.
25. UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213; see Leary, supra note 6, at 362.
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303.
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Under section 4-303 (1) (d) the drawer's liability on the item
is discharged when the payor bank "has evidenced by ex-
amination of such individual account and by action its de-
cision to pay the item ...." This would normally be an earlier
time than the point at which the drawer's liability is replaced
by his bank's liability under 4-213. The basis of the difference
is that the time allowed for deferred posting27 is a convenience
to the bank and should not enlarge the drawer's liability.
In 'West Side v. Marine, the issue was whether the payor's
acts of photographing the item, stamping it "paid", cancelling
and filing it constituted final payment under 4-213(2) of the
Code, making the provisional credit given to West Side final.
That section provides:
4-213(2) If provisional settlement for an item between
the presenting and payor banks is made through a clearing
house or by debits or credits in an account between them...
they become final upon final payment of the item by the
payor bank.
Part one of the same section specifies when this final pay-
ment occurs.
4-213 (1) (A) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when
the bank has done any of the following, whichever happens
first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to re-
voke the settlement and without having such right
under statute,2 8 clearing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indi-
cated account of the drawer, maker or other person
to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed
to revoke the settlement in the time and manner per-
mitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b),(c) or (d)
the payor bank shall be accountable for the amount of the
item (emphasis added).
27. UNIFORM£ COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301, Comment 1.
28. The statutory right to revoke a settlement is provided by UNnroa Com-
mERcrAL CODE § 4-301.
[Vol. 20
38
outh Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss1/6
CoMirNrs
It was West Side's contention that Marine had "completed
the process of posting." The Uniform Commercial Code was
amended in 1962 to define the "process of posting."
4-109. The "process of posting" means the usual pro-
cedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay
an item and in recording the payment including one or
more of the following or other steps as determined by
the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action
with respect to the item (emphasis added).
On the basis of subsection (e), the court determined that the
"process of posting" was not completed until the statutory time
for reversal of entries had expired. That time is the "midnight
deadline" 29 referred to in sections 4-213 (1) (d) and 4-301.
Before the addition of section 4-109, the "process of posting"
was generally held to include two elements: (1) judgment of the
payor bank as to the sufficiency of the account and the veracity
of the item and; (2) a mechanical step of recording the decision
to pay, usually by a debit of the account.30 The entire tenor of
the collection sections is based on the concept that "final payment
occurs at some point in the processing of the item by the payor
bank." 1 "If a payor bank has not previously paid an item in
cash or finally settled for it, certain internal acts or procedures
will produce final payment of the item."3 2 If section 4-109(e)
is interpreted to mean that the process of posting is completed
only upon the expiration of the midnight deadline, it is obvious
from the foregoing quotations that this section will not clarify
the Code's use of the term. It will instead substitute a meaning
for the process of posting which is at variance with the existing
29. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(h) defines "midnight deadline" as
midnight of the next banking day.
30. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-303, Comment 3. Ohio did not adopt
§ 4-109 and in Gibbs v. Gerberich, 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E2d 851 (1964)
the court determined that the process of posting was not completed until both
the judgment and accounting steps were completed.
31. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, Comment 2.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213, Comment 5 (emphasis added).
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law. The reporter states that, "T]his section [4-109] defines
what is meant by the 'process of posting.' "3l He refers to section
4-213 (1) (c) as an aid in the definition. The court's interpreta-
tion of 4-109 (e), however, broadens the plain meaning attributed
to 4-213(1) (c). The reference to it in 4-109, therefore, seems
pointless as a definition of "process of posting." This would indi-
cate that the "process of posting" definition should be interpreted
to complement the Code's usage of the term instead of derogating
it.
The court quoted in its decision portions of a law review
article.3 4 This article concludes that "in the absence of a pro-
vision to that effect [debiting the drawer's account is final pay-
ment] the rule [clearing house deadline] should be interpreted to
mean that the check is not paid until the expiration of the return
period." 3  :Reliance upon this quoted proposition, however, does
not seem justified since this case was argued on the Code and
not on clearing house rules. The Uniform Commercial Code,
moreover, makes a provision for final payment--completion of
the process of posting.
The court interpreted section 4-109(e) to mean that any entry
upon the drawer's account could be reversed before the "midnight
deadline." It rejected an interpretation which would make "entry"
mean only erroneous entry (i.e., when the payor bank debited the
account in an incorrect amount). The court, in effect, interpreted
the terms "correcting" and "reversing" to allow a bank, either to
correct an erroneous entry, "or" to reverse that entry for any
reason, before the midnight deadline. 36 The court's interpretation
will dilute section 4-213(1) (d) to near meaninglessness and
create considerable inconsistencies in the other sections 7 dealing
with the issue of final payment, as well as contradict the stated
theory on which the sections are based. A statutory construction
which will avoid these effects, therefore, does not seem un-
reasonable.
This could be accomplished by construing "correcting or
reversing an entry" so as to make "reversing" a form of "cor-
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-109, Comment.
34. Andrews, supra note 17, at 155.
35. Id. at 168; cf. Wallace, Comments On the Proposed Uniform Check Col-
lection Code, 16 VA. L. REv. 792, 805 (1930).
36. This follows from an interpretation of "or" as used in the disjunctive
sense. For an alternative statutory construction of the word "or" see 2 SuTHRm-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 4923 (3d ed. 1943).
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL.. CODE §§ 4-301, 4-303.
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recting." The section, moreover, seems posited on the making
of mistakes by the use of the word "correcting" which implies
error and the word "erroneous." The phrase "correcting an entry"
has its most obvious meaning, not as an obliteration of the entry,
but rather as an alteration 8 of it. This would be the case as in
the previous example in which the payor bank had debited the
account in an incorrect amount. It would be unreasonable to
presume that posting was then completed and that no further
action could be taken. When the entry was completely erroneous
the correction would be to reverse the entry. If 4-109 (e) is so in-
terpreted, the harmony of Article Four's treatment of collection
is preserved.3 9
The last question raised by the case concerns the practical
matter of allowing a payor bank a fixed amount of time in which
to revoke its credits for any reason. Section 4-303 will partially
protect the payee from the bank's use of the excess time to make
itself a preferred creditor by means of a set-off. The drawer is
likewise protected against the bank's dishonoring a check in order
to secure its own rights against the account.4 0 The query re-
mains: "What will be the limit of the discretion given to the
bank to revoke its credits within the fixed time period?" The
bank does not become liable on the item until it is finally paid. So
long as its customer (the drawer) agrees, it may defeat any in-
terest of the owner (payee) within the time period, owing no legal
obligation to anyone except the drawer.41 This type of arrange-
ment puts the owner in a position more vulnerable than the pre-
Code law allowed.
This interpretation of section 4-109 has created a situation
which was obviously not contemplated at the last draft of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Barring a clarification in the Code
itself, it will be up to the courts to determine whether section
4-109 should be blended into the general purpose of Article Four,
or be the point of departure for a new body of law on the subject
of final payment.
J. DAviiD HAw nms
38. WEBsTER's NEAW INTERNATIONAL DICTioNARY (2d ed. 1936) lists the fol-
lowing synonyms for the word "correct": "amend, reform, remedy, better, im-
prove."
39. See UmFoRo CoammACIA CoDE § 1-102 (Subsection one has particular
significance).
40. UNiFova CoMMERciAL CoDE § 4-402.
41. See Leary, supra note 6, at 364-65.
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